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an Award of Nominal Disability Benefits to an
Injured Longshoreman to Preserve the Right
to Receive Future Benefits?
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by Jay E. Grenig
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Jay E. Grenig is professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, WI;
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ISSUE
Does the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act authorize a continuing award of nominal
disability benefits to a covered
employee who has suffered a partial
permanent injury with a potential
loss of long-term, wage-earning
capacity but who has no present
loss of earnings?
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In 1980 in the course of his employment with Metropolitan Stevedore
Company ("Metropolitan"), John
Rambo, a longshoreman, injured his
back and leg. Rambo filed a claim
for disability benefits under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA" or
the "Act") with the Director of the
Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs of the United States
Department of Labor (the "Director").
In 1983 an Administrative Law Judge
("AL"), acting on behalf of the
Director, found that Rambo had sustained a partial permanent disability
and awarded benefits at the rate of
$80.16 per week.

Rambo subsequently trained to
become a crane operator and
secured longshore work is this new
capacity. He also worked in his
spare time as a heavy lift-truck
operator. Between 1985 and 1990,
Rambo's average weekly wages as a
crane operator ranged between
$1,307.81 and $1,690.50, which was
more than three times his preinjury
earnings, though his physical
condition remained unchanged.
In light of Rambo's increased
wage-earning capacity, Metropolitan
sought to terminate the disability
award, claiming that under Section
22 of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 922
(1994), Rambo's new and considerably more remunerative employment was a "change in condition"
that could support a downward
modification or termination of benefits previously awarded. Section 22
also provides a one-year time period
within which either the employer
or the longshoreman can seek a
change in benefits. The one-year
period runs from the date of the last
benefits payment or from the date a
claim is rejected.
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Rambo unsuccessfully resisted
termination of his benefits award,
arguing that his new job was not a
change in condition within the
meaning of Section 22. The ALJ
hearing the matter agreed with
Metropolitan and ruled that Rambo's
new job was a change in condition
for purposes of Section 22; accordingly, the ALJ terminated the award.
The Department of Labor's Benefits
Review Board (the "Review Board")
affirmed the ALJ's decision, and
Rambo appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that Section 22's change-in-condition requirement for modifying or
terminating an award of disability
benefits called for proof that the
injured employee had undergone a
change in physical condition. In the
Ninth Circuit's view, an increase in
a disabled longshoreman's postinjury earnings, standing alone,
was insufficient to support a
modification or termination of a
prior benefits award. 28 F.3d 86
(9th Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court took the case
and reversed, holding "that a
disability award may be modified
under Section 22 where there is a
change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any
change in the employee's physical
condition." 115 S. Ct. 2144, 2150
(1995), 7 ABA PREVIEW 312 (April 7,
1995). The Court returned the case
to the Ninth Circuit because Rambo
had raised other arguments that the
appeals court had not addressed.
Back in the Ninth Circuit, the court
held that the Review Board should
have reduced Rambo's award of disability benefits to a nominal amount
in the interest of justice, rather than
terminating the award in its entirety. 81 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Ninth Circuit determined that
a nominal award would preserve
Rambo's right to future benefits in
American Bar Association

the event his disability caused a
reduction of earnings at some later
time.
The court explained that "because
Rambo has suffered a permanent
partial disability, there is a significant possibility that he will at some
future time suffer economic harm as
a result of his injury. The LHWCA
mandates a forward look in award
determinations. Thus, the appropriate award modification is a small
award fashioned expressly for the
purpose of preserving the right to
receive compensation should disability in an economic sense ever visit
him." 81 F.3d at 845.
The Ninth Circuit's second decision
in this case is now before the
Supreme Court which granted
Metropolitan's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 504 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
The LHWCA is a comprehensive
scheme to provide compensation
"in respect of disability or death of
an employee . if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of
the United States
." 33 U.S.C.
§ 903(a). As noted, a disability
award under the Act is designed to
compensate a covered employee for
reductions in wage-earning capacity
resulting from a covered injury, as
reductions in the claimant's wageearning capacity may occur throughout his or her lifetime.
Metropolitan, however, argues that
the LHWCA does not guarantee a
complete remedy for all work-related
disabilities under any and all contingencies, but is a compromise of
competing interests. According to
Metropolitan, the compromise
reflected in the Act represents
Congress' balancing of interests and
also represents Congress' decision to
remove the balancing process from
the courts.

Metropolitan takes the position
that the nominal award ordered by
the Ninth Circuit was a mere
device or fiction adopted for the
transparent purpose of evading
Section 22's one-year time limit for
modifying LHWCA benefit awards
when there is a change of condition. By awarding nominal benefits
payable on an on-going basis, the
Ninth Circuit provided Rambo with
carte blanche to secure benefits
should his future earnings decline
regardless of any temporal connection between that decline and his
employment with Metropolitan.
Rambo counters that an award of
nominal benefits is the only mechanism available to incorporate in a
benefits award the possible future
adverse effects of a disability.
According to Rambo, a nominal
award is an appropriate mechanism for anticipating a future loss
of earnings attributable to an
earlier compensable disability.
The Director supports the substance of Rambo's argument.
According to the Director, the
LHWCA authorizes a continuing
nominal award of disability benefits whenever a claimant has sustained no present loss of earnings
but has established the likelihood
of such a loss in the future as a
result of an earlier, covered injury.
The Director relies on Section 8(h)
of the LHWCA which provides that
the Director may determine a covered employee's actual earnings for
purposes of an award "having due
regard
to the effect of disability
as it may naturally extend into the
future." 33 U.S.C. § 908(h). The
Director maintains that a claimant
who has demonstrated that a covered injury will more likely than
not result in a loss of earnings in
the future has shown a loss of longterm, wage-earning capacity that
establishes a disability within the
(Continued on Page 370)
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meaning of the Act. If the claimant
is not experiencing a current loss of
earnings, the Director says that the
entry of a continuing nominal award
is the appropriate course of action
because it accounts for the fact that
the claimant's future ability to compete in the open labor market may
have been impaired. The fact that a
primary purpose of a nominal award
is to prevent triggering Section 22's
one-year limitation period does not
mean that such an award is inappropriate.
The Director, however, takes a
different position on the proper
procedure for ordering a continuing
nominal award. In the Director's
view, the Ninth Circuit exceeded its
authority by ordering a nominal
award without first permitting the
ALJ and the Review Board to consider the matter. The Director
argues that the Ninth Circuit should
have sent the case back to those
administrative forums for further
proceedings to determine the likely
effect of Rambo's injury on his longterm, wage-earning capacity.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case involves the interpretation
of a provision of the LHWCA and
the authority of courts to effectuate
the purposes of the Act. On this
point, the Supreme Court has held
that courts are not free, under the
guise of statutory interpretation, to
amend provisions of the LHWCA.
Speaking directly to the one-year
limitation period of Section 22, the
Court observed that "we are aware
that the LHWCA is a humanitarian
act, and that it should be construed
liberally to effectuate its purposes;
but that does not give us the power
to rewrite the statute of limitations
at will, and make what was intended
to be a limitation no limitation at
all." Pillsbury v. United Eng. Co.,
342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952).
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For injuries such as those Rambo
sustained, loss of wage-earning
capacity is an element of the
claimant's case. A claimant is not
considered disabled unless he or
she proves incapacity to earn
wages because of injury. 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(10). A nominal award of benefits, in effect, extends a claimant's
right to modification indefinitely
notwithstanding the language of
Section 22.
When Congress first enacted
Section 22 as part of the original
LHWCA in 1927, it permitted modification only during the term of an
award. In 1934, Congress rejected a
recommendation that there be an
unlimited time period for modification and, instead, established a
one-year period. In 1938 and 1983,
Congress rejected proposals to
change the one-year limit.
The District of Columbia, Second,
and Fifth Circuits have ruled that a
nominal award may be used to preserve a possible future award under
Section 22 when there is a significant physical impairment without a
present loss of earnings. Randall v.
Comfort Control, Inc., 725 F.2d 791
(D.C. Cir. 1984); LaFaille v. Benefits
Review Bd., 884 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1989); Hole v. Miami Shipyards
Corp., 640 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1981).
On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit declined to approve such
an award because of insufficient
evidence of a future downturn in
earnings. Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit appeared to accept the
principle that a nominal award may
be appropriate in some cases to
facilitate subsequent modification
necessitated by a later reduction in
wage-earning capacity. Fleetwood v.
Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co., 776 F.2d 1225
(4th Cir. 1985).

The Review Board, however, has not
been shy about expressing its dissatisfaction with court-ordered nominal awards of disability benefits,
viewing them as judicial infringements on the province of Congress
because, in the absence of legislative consideration, they extend
indefinitely the time period provided for modifying or terminating
awards under Section 22. Citing the
legislative history of Section 22, the
Director agrees that Congress
intended that the Act would allow
consideration of the effects of an
injury causing permanent partial
disability on an employee's future
ability to earn. The Director only
objects to who makes this determination in the first instance - the
courts or the administrative agency
charged with implementing the Act.
Not surprisingly, the Director insists
that the administrative agency
should make the initial determination as to the appropriateness of a
nominal benefits award. The
Supreme Court's decision in this
case could resolve this issue.
On a more immediate level, a decision for Metropolitan will limit the
responsibility of maritime employers for injuries to employees who
return to regular and continuous
work at wages in excess of preinjury
average weekly wages. A decision
for Rambo will make it easier for
disabled employees to seek modification of their benefits when circumstances change, but such a
decision will increase the exposure
to liability of maritime employers.
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